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Abstract
Is it possible to perceive others’ mental states? Are mental states visible in others’ behavior? In contrast to the traditional view 
that mental states are hidden and not directly accessible to perception, in recent years a phenomenologically-motivated account of 
social cognition has emerged: direct social perception. However, despite numerous published articles that both defend and critique 
direct perception, researchers have made little progress in articulating the conditions under which direct perception of others’ mental 
states is possible. This paper proposes an empirically anchored approach to the observability of others’ mentality – not just in the 
weak sense of discussing relevant empirical evidence for and against the phenomenon of interest, but also, and more specifically, 
in the stronger sense of identifying an experimental strategy for measuring the observability of mental states and articulating the 
conditions under which mental states are observable. We conclude this article by reframing the problem of direct perception in 
terms of establishing a definable and measurable relationship between movement features and perceived mental states.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Seeing mental states: the current debate
1.1. The unobservability principle
How is knowledge of other minds possible? How-possible questions of this nature arise when something that seems 
impossible nevertheless happens. These are, therefore, obstacle-dependent questions: we ask how knowledge of x is 
possible when there appears to be an insuperable obstacle preventing knowledge of x [1]. In the case of knowledge 
of other minds, the apparent obstacle is the supposed opacity of other minds, such as the idea that we can never have 
direct knowledge of another’s mental state [2]. This idea, called the ‘Unobservability Principle’ [3], ‘Unobservability 
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hypotheses and frameworks behind much of the research in social cognition [7–9]. According to the ‘Unobservability 
Principle’, we never actually see another’s mental states; that is, mental states, qua being intracranial phenomena, are 
perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner.
Accepting this principle motivates the question of how one might access another person’s mind.
People do not have direct information about others’ mental states and must therefore base their inferences on 
whatever information about others’ mental states they do have access to. This requires a leap from observable 
behavior to unobservable mental states that is so common and routine that people often seem unaware that they 
are making a leap [10].
A logical corollary to the ‘Unobservability Principle’ is the idea of a mechanism to infer others’ invisible mental 
states [11], such as a theory of mind [12]. As Gallagher [13] puts it: “I cannot see into your mind, hence, I have to 
devise some way of inferring what must be there”. According to this account, “one of the most important powers 
of the human mind is to conceive of and think about itself and other minds. Because the mental states of others are 
completely hidden from the senses, they can only ever be inferred” [11].
1.2. The direct social perception thesis
This view of the mind as an unobservable phenomenon has recently been challenged by the ‘direct social percep-
tion’ thesis. Proponents of this thesis argue that it is sometimes possible to directly perceive the mental states of others 
[13–17]. Often, we do not need to infer mental states through observing a target’s behavior. We just see the mental 
states with the same immediacy and directness as we perceive ordinary objects. “If I directly see my car I do not 
ordinarily have to make an inference on the basis of what I see that it is my car”, writes Gallagher [13]; “I do not see 
red mass, shape, and color, and then try to piece all of that together to make it add up to my car. I simply and directly 
see my car” [13]. With the same immediacy, we may sometimes see another person’s emotions or intentions.
In this increasingly popular view, the alleged obstacle blocking the possibility of direct knowledge of other minds 
– their fundamental hiddenness – is eschewed [18]. The problem of other minds dissolves, as does the need of infer-
ential processes [3]. Inferring a hidden set of mental states is simply unnecessary, seeing that “expressive behavior is 
saturated with the meaning of the mind; it reveals the mind to us” [19].
But how would mental states actually be revealed [3]? What degree of visual presence would they exhibit [20]? 
Which mental states would be visible and which would not? Despite numerous articles that defend and critique direct 
perception, there has been little progress toward answering these questions and articulating the conditions under which 
direct perception of mental states is, or would be, possible [21–24]. The claim that mental states are ‘observable’ thus 
far remains just as speculative as the claim that they are ‘unobservable’.
2. Our approach
As a way out of this impasse, this review proposes an empirically anchored approach to the problem of the (un-) 
observability of others’ mentality – not just in the weak sense of discussing relevant empirical evidence for and 
against the observability of others’ mental states, but also in the stronger sense of identifying an experimental strategy 
for determining whether and to what extent a given mental state is observable.
Surprisingly, one aspect largely neglected by both proponents and opponents of the direct social perception thesis 
is the availability of information to perceive mental states (see Box 1). We suggest herein that an apt characterization 
of the observability of others’ mental states requires one to quantitatively assess the mentalistic information available 
in the observable behavior. Put simply, to probe observers’ basic capacity to perceive mental states, one must first 
demonstrate the availability of mentalistic information in the observed behavioral patterns (Step 1). Having demon-
strated that information about mental states is encoded in behavioral patterns, one can then use rigorous quantitative 
behavioral techniques to test the perceptual efficiency of this information, i.e., the usefulness of this information for 
perception (Step 2). Using modeling techniques, one can then identify the specific features that observers use to detect 
mental states, and establish a measurable relationship between those features and the observability of the mental states 
(Step 3). Finally, one can manipulate the observability of the mental states (i.e., increasing or decreasing the visibility 
of mental states) by modifying the parameters of the observed movements (Step 4).
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literature: the perception of others’ intentions from subtle variations in movement kinematics [25]. First, we briefly 
review the phenomenon of interest as it appears, or fails to appear, and identify some of the pitfalls that might account 
for apparent contradictory findings in the literature. Then, drawing on data from recent and decisive studies [26], 
we delineate the experimental steps to overcome these pitfalls and quantitatively characterize the visibility of others’ 
intentions. The focus of this paper is on perceiving intentions; however, as discussed in last part of the article, the 
approach herein could be used to probe the observability of any mental state instantiated into a behavioral pattern, 
ranging from emotions to motives. We conclude by proposing an alternative conception of direct social perception, 
where ‘direct’ no longer defines the nature of perception (inferential vs. direct), but rather the perceptual efficacy of 
available mentalistic information.
BOX 1. Ecological psychology and beyond
The operational approach described here to defining direct social perception has a kindred spirit as well as a 
precedence in the ecological approach to perception-action as originally conceived by Gibson [27] and further 
developed by Shaw, Turvey, and Mace [28]. Ecological psychology is grounded in the assumption of the availability 
of regularities in the properties of the world as the basis of reliable information for perceiving-acting systems ([29]
for review). Accordingly, much of the research agenda for ecological psychology is aimed at identifying the sources 
of information that specify these regularities [30]. Our approach complements and extends the ecological psychology 
agenda by positing that specificational information is also available to perceive at least some of the mental states 
of other people. Put simply, regularities in kinematic pattern specify the performer’s mental states. The challenge, 
then, becomes one of determining whether and to what extend perceivers can or do utilize information specifying 
mental states [see also [22]].
3. The observability of others’ intentions: a current controversy
Is it possible to understand others’ intentions by simply observing their movements? Previous studies, including 
some from our own laboratory, have yielded conflicting results [31–38]. Some studies indicate that observers can 
identify and use early differences in movement kinematics to discern intentions and subjective states [31,33,36–39]. 
For instance, Sartori and colleagues [36] showed that in a binary choice design observers were able to judge whether 
the agent’s intent in grasping the object was to cooperate or compete by only using available kinematic information. 
In a follow-up study, Manera et al. [33] demonstrated that observers have no trouble identifying cooperative and 
competitive intentions, even from relatively degraded point-light displays of grasping actions. However, the same 
study also found that performance dropped to chance level when participants discriminated cooperative actions from 
individual-oriented actions [33]. Other investigators had difficulties replicating Sartori et al.’s [36] initial findings. 
Using a somewhat different procedure, Naish et al. [34] varied the duration of the observed movements so as to 
estimate how much of the action participants needed to see in order to correctly predict the action unfolding (to eat or 
to place). The result was that observers were unable to anticipate the intention to eat or to place until they had seen at 
least part of the post-grasp kinematics.
Why did Naish et al.’s participants show less perceptual sensitivity to intention-related information than Sartori 
et al.’s? Apart from methodological differences, one problem in interpreting these patterns of results arises from 
a general lack of data about availability of stimulus information. All the above studies relied almost exclusively 
on indirect evidence of intention-related information in the observed movements; none measured this information, 
resulting potentially in a set of ‘pitfalls’ that we enumerate below.
Pitfall #1: Studies do not consider the availability of intention-information. Somewhat surprisingly, some studies did 
not even consider the problem of quantifying intention-related information in the observed movements 
(e.g., [37,38]). Insofar as observers can detect intention, this may be negligible. In such cases, as Runeson 
[40] suggested, it is tempting “to use perception as a measure device”, treating the human perceptual system 
as a practical device for measuring complex kinematics invariants. However, from a logical perspective, 
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mation with its usefulness for perception. The limits of this approach become apparent when evaluated 
against the inability to detect intention. In such cases, it would indeed be impossible to determine whether 
observers lack the ability to pick up intention-related information (despite its availability), or whether such 
information is simply unavailable in the first place.
Pitfall #2: Studies assume the availability of intention-information. Other studies assumed, rather than measured, 
the availability of stimulus information. Commenting on the negative results by Naish et al., for example, 
Catmur [41] recently emphasized that “this inability to acquire intention information from kinematics is 
perhaps surprising since there were reliable differences between the kinematic profiles of the two types 
of actions”. However, Naish et al. did not collect kinematic data for the movements being viewed. Rather, 
they obtained kinematic data within an independent action execution study by testing 17 participants. 
Having demonstrated that grasp-to-eat and grasp-to-place actions result in reliable kinematic differences, 
they then filmed three actors performing these movements and had participants view the corresponding 
clips. As such, the researchers did not directly assess intention-related differences in the movements being 
viewed, but rather assumed them based on the results obtained in a separate and much larger sample. 
The problem with this strategy is that it neglects a ubiquitous, often unwanted characteristic of motor 
performance: motor variability [42]. Performing a movement repeatedly does not result in the same motor 
output on every attempt. “Practice”, as Nikolai Bernstein summarized his theory, “is repetition without 
repetition” [43]. In performing the same task, outputs of the motor system vary quite substantially from 
one trial to another, as well as from one individual to the next. One can thus not assume that all movements 
performed with a given intention are informative to the same extent. It is thus not clear whether Naish et al. 
have sufficient evidence to conclude “that most people are not able to detect subtle kinematic differences 
between, specifically, pre-grasp movements with different subsequent outcomes”.
Pitfall #3: Studies only consider average kinematic differences. Caution is needed when interpreting kinematic dif-
ferences averaged over trials and subjects. Take, for instance, the work by Manera et al. [33] discussed 
above. The findings in their experiment appear to suggest that observers were unable to report kinematic 
differences between cooperative and individual-oriented movements; but again, this conclusion might be 
spurious. The rationale for questioning this conclusion is that observers were not exposed to the entire 
set of movements (n = 160), for which mean differences are duly reported, but only to a subset of ran-
domly selected movements (n = 60). Owing to variations of single trials, the selection procedure might 
have narrowed the kinematic differences between cooperative and individual-oriented movements. Thus, 
as the authors recognize, one cannot be certain of the amount of intention information available to judge 
the intention.
4. Measuring the observability of intentions
The strategy we propose to overcome these pitfalls and quantify the observability of intentions combines rigorous 
kinematic and quantitative behavioral techniques with modeling and classification analysis. As the implementation 
of these techniques has been recently reviewed elsewhere [44] in the following section, we only provide a general 
conceptual overview of the methods and their function in determining whether, and to what extent, intentions are 
observable.
4.1. Step 1: Quantify the availability of intention information
Following Marteniuk et al.’s seminal work [45], a plethora of studies have documented the influence of intention 
on human grasping parameters. The logic of these studies has been to manipulate the intention while keeping constant 
the to-be-grasped object. Ansuini et al. [46], for example, asked participants to reach towards and grasp a bottle 
so they might accomplish one of four possible actions: pouring, displacing, throwing, or passing. Their analysis of 
reach-to-grasp kinematics revealed that when participants grasped the bottle with the intent to pour, both the middle 
and the ring fingers were more extended than in all the other considered intentions. The authors took this as evidence 
for the influence of intention on hand-preshaping. Other studies have reported similar effects in the domain of social 
and communicative intention [47–49]. For instance, one study showed that participants’ maximal finger aperture is 
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person, compared to intending to place it on a concave support [47]. Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive list of studies 
demonstrating modulation of grasping parameters by intentions.
Table 1
Studies demonstrating modulation of reach-to-grasp parameters by intention. n.a. not applicable.
Study Type of intention Reaching component Grasping component
Ansuini et al., 2006 Individual
(grasp-to-lift vs. grasp-to-place)
Movement duration Finger angular excursions
Ansuini et al., 2008 Individual
(grasp-to-pass, grasp-to-throw, 
grasp-to-place, and grasp-to-pour)
Movement duration Finger angular excursions;
Abduction angles
Armbruster & Spijkers, 2006 Individual
(grasp-to-lift, grasp-to-throw away, and 
grasp-to-place)
Time to peak acceleration;
Mean velocity;
Maximum grip aperture
Becchio et al., 2008a Individual vs. Social
(grasp-to-place vs. grasp-to-pass)
Maximum grip aperture;
Peak grip closing velocity








Time of maximum grip aperture
Crajè et al., 2011 Individual
(grasp-to-lift vs. grasp-to-pour)
n.a. Finger position at contact





Flindall & Gonzales, 2013 Individual
(grasp-to-eat vs. grasp-to-place vs. 
grasp-to-spit)
Peak velocity Maximum grip aperture







Time of maximum grip aperture
Marteniuk et al., 1987 Individual
(grasp-to-throw vs. grasp-to-lit)
Movement duration;
Duration of deceleration and 
acceleration phase
n.a.




Grasp position at contact




Sartori et al., 2009 Individual vs. social
(grasp-to-lift vs. 
grasp-to-communicate)
Time of maximum trajectory height;
Maximum wrist deviation
Finger opening velocity
Sartori et al., 2011 Individual
(grasp-to-pour vs. grasp-to-move)
Movement duration Maximum grip aperture;
Time of maximum grip aperture;
Fingers’ position at contact




Time to peak velocity;
Deceleration time;
Time to peak acceleration and 
deceleration
Grasp position at contact
These studies indicate that humans grasp objects in ways that reflect their intention. But does movement kinematics 
convey specificational information to discriminate intention? This goes beyond asking whether movements performed 
with different intentions differ on average on one or more kinematic parameters; it requires determining whether 
movement patterns specify intentions, i.e., whether information relevant to discriminate intention is available in the 
spatiotemporal patterns underlying the movements.1
1 The term information is used here in the specificational sense of Turvey [62] and is thus reserved for those patterns that unambiguously specify 
intentions.
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classification analysis, such as linear discriminant analysis (LDA). Given a set of kinematic features, LDA can be 
used to find the linear combinations of features that provide the best discrimination between two or more intentions. 
If the kinematic features are informative about the intentions, then a high classification score is achieved. Fig. 1 shows 
the results of an LDA applied to reach-to-grasp movements of bottle performed with four possible intentions: pouring, 
placing, drinking, and passing.
Fig. 1. Scatterplot of the two best linear discriminant functions in a linear discriminant analysis. Circles, labelled by the intention ‘to place’, ‘to 
pour’, ‘to drink’ and ‘to pass’, represent grasping movements. Grey squares represent the centroid of each intention. (For interpretation of the 
references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
The scatterplot (axes represent the two best discriminant functions) represents movements as circles labelled by 
intention. The distance of each circle to the centroid (i.e., mean value based on the linear combination of the pre-
dictor variables) of each class reflects the probability that the movement belongs to the corresponding intention. In 
other words, this distance (known as Mahalanobis distance) is interpretable in terms of standard deviations from the 
centroid. A case located 2 Mahalanobis distance units from the centroid, for example, would have a less than 0.05 
chance of belonging to that intention. Overall, classification score (0.79 in the portrayed example) provides a measure 
of intention-specific information available in the recorded movements.
4.2. Step 2: Determine the perceptual efficiency of intention information
As Runeson and Frykholm noted [50], the demonstration of availability of specificational information is, per se, 
not sufficient to establish its perceptual efficiency, that is, the usefulness of the available information for perception. 
Indeed, despite being available in the stimulus, intention information might nevertheless remain invisible to observers. 
For one thing, information might reside in parametrical variations that are non-discriminable by human observers – 
that is, variations too small to be perceived. Observers may also lack the necessary attunement to pick up the available 
intention information. Provided that specificational information is available in the movements to be used as stimuli, 
the second step is thus to probe observers’ sensitivity to this information.
One approach to examining the usefulness of intention-related information for perception is to manipulate the 
information available through temporal occlusion [26]. Imagine one is observing an agent grasping a bottle with the 
action occluded at the time the fingers contact the bottle: is she intending to drink or to pass the bottle to another 
person?
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sequential sampling models [51–55]. These models, including the drift-diffusion model (DDM; [56]), are centered on 
the assumption that sequentially sampling and accumulating noisy evidence to a decision criterion produces discrimi-
nation judgments [56,57]. For binary choices, the DDM decomposes behavioral data (RTs and choice) into four main 
parameters mapped onto latent psychological processes: boundary separation a for response caution, drift rate v for 
speed of accumulation, starting point z for a-priori response bias, and non-decision time t0 for stimulus encoding and 
response execution latencies [58]. When no prior information is available, the distance from the starting point z to the 
decision criterion a is the same for the two alternative choices. At the same time, the strength of the observed signal 
determines the rate of evidence accumulation. The mean rate of approach to the decision criterion, i.e., the drift rate v, 
indicates the relative amount of information per time unit that is absorbed.
Fig. 2 provides a schematic illustration of the DDM applied to a perceptual case in which participants have to 
categorize two mental states: intention A and B. The process begins at the starting point z. Intention information 
is collected over the unfolding of the movement until evidence points with sufficient clarity to one intention – the 
process reaches the decision criterion at a. The pattern in Fig. 2 denotes that in most cases, the process reaches the 
upper threshold, indicating a positive drift rate and leading to the choice of the correct intention.
Fig. 2. Schematic of Drift-Diffusion Model. The two decision boundaries represent Intention ‘A’ and Intention ‘B’ in an intention discrimination 
task. The drift rate v represents mean sensory evidence per unit of time. The magnitude of v is determined by the kinematic features of the observed 
movements. The diffusion process starts at a starting point between the two boundaries (denoted as a proportion of a by z) until the accumulated 
evidence reaches one of two boundaries. If the correct boundary is hit (blue sample paths), the model makes a correct decision. Because of noise, 
the model may sometime hit the incorrect boundary (red sample path). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is 
referred to the web version of this article.)
4.3. Step 3: Identify the features observers use to detect intentions
Accumulator models such as the DDM provide a measure of the relative intention-related information gathered 
over time, and are thus well-suited for making graded quantitative assessments of perceptual efficiency. What they do 
not provide, however, is an understanding of the specific features that observers utilize to judge intention.
One way to relate intention judgements to the expression of specific kinematic features is to create a Classification 
and Regression Tree (CART) model [26]. This approach is also known as rule induction because it permits classifi-
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bottle with the intent to drink or to pass? Through a series of yes/no questions, a CART analysis can be used to find the 
kinematic features that separate the data into movements that observers either classify as ‘grasp-to-pour’ or ‘grasp-to 
drink’.
A diagram tree displays the result, as Fig. 3 demonstrates. By traversing any given path from the root node to 
any leaf, classification trees of this sort can transform easily to if . . . then . . . rules, where the if statement defines a
Fig. 3. CART model for predicting intention choice (to-pour vs. to-drink) from the observation of grasping movements. The model is generated 
using participants’ responses as outcome and kinematics features of the observed movements as predictors. Each node provides the total number 
of trials within the node and the number of ‘to-pour’ and ‘to-drink’ choices. For example, node 3 represents high probability of ‘to-pour’ choice 
(category 1 – light blue), while node 6 represents high probability of ‘to-drink’ choice (category 2 – red). Adapted from [26].
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wrist height positioned at 70% of movement duration is lower than 14 cm from the table surface and the dorsum plane 
is more flexed than −0.30 cm, then intention choice by an observer is expected to be ‘to pour’ with 0.74 probability. 
This form enables the computation of two types of predictions: i) a point prediction about the intention choice, and, 
ii) a distributional prediction about the probability associated with the point prediction. Using a CART model, we 
can thus not only predict an observer’s intention choice (e.g., whether the observer will judge the movement to be ‘to 
pour’ or ‘to drink’), but also the likelihood of the predicted choice (i.e., how likely the observer will report that the 
observed movement is ‘to pour’ or ‘to drink’).
4.4. Step 4: Alter the observability of intentions
As illustrated in Step 3, CART provides a direct tool with which to map intention choice to the expression of specific 
kinematic features. But how do we know that observers are actually using those features? The ultimate demonstration 
would be the precise manipulation of intention visibility based on those kinematic features. If observers use the subset 
of kinematic features identified by CART to classify intention, then presenting participants with movements that 
express these features should aid in intention discrimination. Conversely, presenting movements that do not express 
these features should make judgement more difficult.
One way to test these predictions is to combine the probability of the predicted choice derived from CART with 
the actual movement intention, and use this information to select, for each intention, two subsets of movements:
– High-informative movements, i.e., movements for which the predicted probability of correct choice is high (e.g., 
‘to pour’ with 0.70 probability);
– Low-informative movements, i.e., movements for which the predicted probability of correct choice is low (e.g., 
‘to pour’ with 0.50 probability).
Intention observability, as measured by drift rate (see Step 2), should vary as a function of movement informa-
tiveness, being significantly higher for high-informative movements compared to low-informative movements. As 
shown in Fig. 4, this result is precisely what is found, which indicates that modifying the kinematic parameters of the 
movements being viewed can directly affect intention observability.
Fig. 4. Drift rate as function of CART selection. Drift rate is significantly larger for movements for which the CART model predicts higher 
classification accuracy.
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Are intentions observable in others’ movements? Debate on this question has been primarily focused on untestable 
theoretical considerations on the observability of mental states (for an overview of the arguments, see [18]). The 
operational approach we have developed here allows one to translate the abstract concept of ‘observability’ into a 
quantifiable property – a property that one can not only measure, but also manipulate. Summarizing the above reported 
findings, observability (o) could be described formally as follows:
o = f (Ib + E)
where o is a function of the product between the behavioral specification of an intention (the quantified available 
information, I ) and the usefulness of I for perception (perceptual efficiency, b) plus the error (E). One might represent 
this product as a sum of individual contributions of multiple sources of information (Ii) and their corresponding 
perceptual efficiencies (bi):
o = f (I1b1 + I2b2 + I3b3 + I4b4....+Inbn + E)
In the case of intention-from-movement understanding, these sources would correspond to information from multiple 
kinematic features, and their respective efficiencies.
We may in principle apply this formulation – which we intend to be provocative, rather than definitive – not only 
to intentions, but also to any mental state instantiated into a specific pattern of behavior, including emotions, motives, 
and even desires. Are others’ emotions visible? Are motives in performing a given action visible to others? If we 
are to accept the above formulation of observability, then the process for answering these questions will involve the 
following steps:
Step 1. Quantify behavioral specification of the mental state, being the specificational information available to dis-
criminate the mental state in patterns of behavior.
Step 2. Assess the perceptual efficiency of this information by probing observers’ sensitivity to the available mental-
istic information.
Step 3. Identify the specific features that observers use to detect the mental states.
Step 4. Put the identified features to the test by manipulating the visibility of the mental states.
In this process, each step presupposes the results of the previous step to be available. Importantly, the process 
does not assume the observability of mental states, but rather is meant as a strategy to quantify the observability of 
those states. As a result of Steps 1–4, a mental state will be quantified as more or less visible. When information 
to discriminate a mental state is not available in the pattern of behavior (Step 1) or, despite being available, is not 
useful for perception (Step 2), the mental state will be invisible to human observers. In either of these two cases, 
understanding what the other person thinks, desires, or believes requires “a leap from observable behavior to unob-
servable mental states”, as Epley and Waytz [10] stated. Thus, the proposed approach does not deny that some mental 
states are invisible, but rather contends that unobservability is something that can be measured. This has not only 
theoretical significance but potential impact in application, the range of applications spanning from social signal pro-
cessing to human-robot interaction (e.g., making humanoid robots’ movements more predictable for human partners, 
see BOX 2).
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Implementing a theory of mind for a robot has been a long-lasting dream for robotics researchers [59]. While 
this remains a challenge, the ‘Observability Principle’ suggests that a robot would often need less than a full-blown 
theory of mind to take part in human social dynamics. The ability to pick-up mentalistic information in behavioral 
patterns would already allow a robot to read a range of mental states, i.e., those mental states that are instantiated in 
discriminable patterns of behavior.
What is more, reverse engineering of the ‘Observability Principle’ may inform the design of robotic motion to 
improve human-robot interaction. If we are to build human-like robots that can interact naturally with people, our 
robots must not only be able to read the mental states of human agents, they also must be able to express behaviors 
that are ‘readable’ for human agents. The simplest solution would appear to incorporate human-like patterns of 
behavior in the controller of humanoid-robots; for example, by simply retargeting human motion capture data to 
robots. Due to constraints of robot mechanics (e.g., the degrees of freedom differ in number or location on the 
kinematic structures of robots and humans), however, this often does not produce human-like patterns [60].
The ‘Observability Principle’ suggests that instead of retargeting human motion capture data, one could use 
Steps 3 and 4 in the above described process to identify a minimal set of kinematic parameters that the robotic 
motion should satisfy (Fig. 5). Consider the CART model discussed above. In addition to the point and distributional 
predictions, CART analysis also provides a variable importance score, reflecting the contribution each variable 
(i.e., kinematic feature) makes in predicting the intention choice by observers. We predict that optimizing robotic 
movements to satisfy kinematic features ranked as most important should improve detection accuracy of robot 
motions, thus making it easier for a human partner to anticipate the robot’s intention, i.e., to anticipate what the 
robot will do next. Following a similar logic, other mental states, such as emotion and attention, could be made 
observable in the robotic behavior.
The methods described in Step 2 could then be used to define a metric for the evaluation of quality in robotic 
motion, and validate the optimization of the robotic motion based on the selected features. As illustrated in Fig. 5, 
the process of feature selection could be reiterated (including other features ranked as important) until discrimination 
of robotic motion by human observers reaches the desired accuracy.
Fig. 5. Experimental strategy to measure and manipulate the observability of mental states. Experimental steps to determine whether and to what 
extent mental states are observable in patterns of behavior are shown in boxes surrounded by a solid line. Application to design of robotic motion 
is shown in boxes surrounded by a grey dotted line. The robotic platform ICub (courtesy of ICub facility) is represented on the right side. The 
horizontal bar plot (lower right) shows the variable score importance obtained from the CART model in Step 3 and validated in Step 4. The blue 
dashed line indicates commonality of methods.
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In line with the Gibsonian tradition that defines directness as not being supplemented by inferential processes 
[30], the standard way of framing the direct social perception thesis has focused on the nature of perception. Is 
perception smart enough to enable us to grasp what others are thinking or doing without the addition of some mediating 
‘mindreading’, inferential mechanism [13]? If the perceptual processes involved in social cognition were ‘dumb’, 
perception would need to be supplemented with interpretation sustained by extra-perceptual inferential processes 
before an individual could figure out another’s emotions and intentions [61]. On the contrary, if perception were 
‘smart’, then what one sees would already make sense. In other words, one could non-inferentially see others’ mental 
states.
An interesting implication of the approach described here is that it does not require perception to be that smart for 
it to be direct. As long as mentalistic information is available in the stimulus, even not-so-smart perception [13] is 
capable of perceiving mental states.
Based on this framework, we propose to reconceptualize the notion of ‘direct’ perception as follows:
Perception of a mental state from a given behavior is ‘direct’ insofar as the features of the observed behavior 
predict the mental state an observer will perceive.
A key advantage of this formulation is that it turns the issue of ‘direct’ perception into one that is empirically 
addressable. If a definable and measurable relationship between movement features and perceived mental states can 
be established, then perception may be qualified as ‘direct’. In this case, direct would no longer define the nature of 
perception, but instead would relate to the perceptual efficacy of available mentalistic information.
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